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Harnessing the power of social incentives to curb shirking in teams
Journal article   Peer reviewed

Harnessing the power of social incentives to curb shirking in teams

Brice Corgnet, Brian C. Gunia and Roberto Hernán-González
Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, Vol.30(1), pp.139-167
01/03/2021

Abstract

Social Incentives Social Pressure Moral Hazard in Teams Laboratory experiments
We study several solutions to shirking in teams, each of which triggers social incentives by reshaping the workplace social context. Using an experimental design, we manipulate social pressure at work by varying the type of workplace monitoring and the extent to which employees are allowed to engage in social interaction. This design allows us to assess the effectiveness as well as the appeal of each solution. Despite similar effectiveness in boosting productivity, only organizational systems involving social interaction (via chat) were comparably appealing to a baseline treatment. This suggests that solutions involving social interaction are more likely to be effective in the long‐run than solutions involving monitoring alone.
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Collaboration types
Domestic collaboration
International collaboration
Citation topics
6 Social Sciences
6.122 Economic Theory
6.122.437 Cooperation Dynamics
Web of Science research areas
Economics
Management
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