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On the merit of equal pay: Performance manipulation and incentive setting
Journal article   Peer reviewed

On the merit of equal pay: Performance manipulation and incentive setting

Brice Corgnet, Ludivine Martin, Peguy Ndodjang and Angela Sutan
European Economic Review, pp.23-45
01/04/2019

Abstract

Influence activities Incentive theory Theory of the firm Organizational economics
Work performance is often difficult to assess thus leaving room for manipulation of commonly-used metrics. We created a laboratory workplace in which we can precisely assess both work performance along with manipulation activities. Using two independent experiments we show that, whenever pay for performance is used, manipulation is pervasive leading to both a waste of organizational resources and a weakening of incentives. By contrast, paying organizational members equally effectively deters manipulation attempts leading to higher organizational production.
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6 Social Sciences
6.122 Economic Theory
6.122.437 Cooperation Dynamics
Web of Science research areas
Economics
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