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Strategically delusional
Journal article   Peer reviewed

Strategically delusional

Alice Soldà, Changxia Ke, Lionel Page and William von Hippel
Experimental Economics, Vol.23(3), pp.604-631
01/09/2020

Abstract

Overconfidence Motivated cognition Self-deception Persuasion Information sampling Experiment
We aim to test the hypothesis that overconfidence arises as a strategy to influence others in social interactions. To address this question, we design an experiment in which participants are incentivized either to form accurate beliefs about their performance at a test, or to convince a group of other participants that they performed well. We also vary participants’ ability to gather information about their performance. Our results show that participants are more likely to (1) overestimate their performance when they anticipate that they will try to persuade others and (2) bias their information search in a manner conducive to receiving more positive feedback, when given the chance to do so. In addition, we also find suggestive evidence that this increase in confidence has a positive effect on participants’ persuasiveness.
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6 Social Sciences
6.122 Economic Theory
6.122.437 Cooperation Dynamics
Web of Science research areas
Economics
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